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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. §
78-2a-3(2), and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal following the Appellant's entry of a
guilty plea to the offense of Forgery, a second degree felony, in
violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-501.

Judgment was entered on the

guilty plea on November 7, 1988 by the Honorable Frank G. Noel,
Third District Court Judge.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Defendant's guilty plea was received in

compliance with Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the decisional law construing that provision.
2.

Did the Defendant receive effective assistance of

counsel.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 20, 1987, Barbara Harris was arrested at the
Harmons grocery store after attempting to cash a check which was
determined to be a forgery.

While Ms. Harris was being detained,

she was asked by the Harmons security guard if anyone was with
her.

She answered "that there was a gold car out in the parking

lot with the other people that were with her."
1

(8/16/88 T. 6 ) .

Once a deputy sheriff arrived at the scene, the security guard
advised him of the forgery situation inside the store and that
accessories might be located in a suspect vehicle in the Harmons
parking lot (8/16/88 T. 7-8). The deputy sheriff then pulled his
patrol vehicle behind the gold Cadillac which was the only gold
vehicle in the parking lot (8/16/88 T. 7), activated his overhead
lights, and stopped the gold vehicle.
occupant were observed in the vehicle.
male occupant.

One female and one male
The Appellant was the

According to the security guard, permission was

requested and given to search the vehicle by the Appellant
(8-16-88 T. 11).
The Appellant's Motion to Suppress was denied.

In announc-

ing its ruling, the trial court stated that, "There was probable
cause to make a stop.

In any event, the court will deny the

motion to suppress that evidence obtained pursuant to that
arrest."

(8/16/88 T. 36).

On September 12, 1988, the Appellant was scheduled to
proceed to trial. At the request of Salt Lake County Attorney
David Yocom, one of his former law partners, James Barber,
appeared in court as counsel for the Appellant (9/12/88 T.2,3).
The Appellant pleaded guilty to Count III of the Third Amended
Information which alleged Forgery, a second degree felony, in
violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-501. The court relied heavily upon a
2

guilty plea affidavit in receiving the guilty plea.

There was no

on the record compliance with Rule 11(e)(3) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

The court ordered the Appellant to serve the

indeterminate term provided by law of 1-15 years at the Utah
State Prison.

The Appellant is presently serving that sentence.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

At the time that the Defendant entered his guilty plea, the
law in Utah required strict compliance with Rule 11(e) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the Appellant executed an Affidavit when he pleaded guilty which recited that a
guilty plea necessarily waived an accused's rights to confrontation, to cross-examine the witnesses against him, to a jury
trial, and to an appeal, the burden for ensuring Rule 11(e)
compliance was squarely on the judge, and an Affidavit was not a
sufficient substitute for Rule 11(e) compliance on the record at
the time that the guilty plea was entered.

The failure of the

trial court to fulfill the requirements of Rule 11(e)(3) on the
record at the time the Defendant entered his plea mandates
setting aside the Appellant's guilty plea and conviction.
On the morning that the Appellant's case was scheduled to go
to trial, a respected and experienced defense lawyer appeared in
court at the request of the County Attorney to assist the Appellant.

Although defense counsel should be commended for his
3

willingness to volunteer his services on short notice, he was,
under the circumstances, incapable of rendering effective assistance to the Appellant.

Counsel could not intelligently assess

the propriety of the denial of the Motion to Suppress without
reviewing the police reports and a transcript of the testimony at
the suppression hearing.

By pleading guilty, the Appellant

waived his right to challenge the trial judge's denial of his
Motion to Suppress.

However, the stop of the Appellant's motor

vehicle was not supported by an articulable suspicion; and as a
result, the order denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress was
erroneous.

Competent and effective counsel would not have

presumed to advise an accused to plead guilty without a more
thorough understanding of the search issue.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS NOT ENTERED IN COMPLIANCE
WITH RULE 11(e)(3) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, AND STATE V. GIBBONS
At the time that the Appellant pleaded guilty to Forgery,
the trial court erred by failing to comply with the requirements
of Rule 11(e)(3).

That rule states as follows:

"The court. . .

shall not accept [a plea of guilty] until the court has made the
findings:

(3)

that the defendant knows he has rights against

compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront
4

and cross-examine in open court the witnesses against him, and
that by entering the plea he waives all of those rights."
The record evidence from the change of plea hearing clearly
establishes that the trial court failed to make a specific
inquiry as to whether the Appellant understood that by entering
his plea, he waived his rights against self-incrimination, to
confrontation, to a jury trial, and to appeal.

Failure to comply

with the requirements of Rule 11(e)(3) necessitates setting aside
the guilty plea.
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court held that "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial
courts the burden of ensuring constitutional and Rule 11(e)
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered."
Id. at 1312. Gibbons was decided on June 30, 1987. The Appellant pleaded guilty in the instant matter on September 12, 1988.
Strict, and not just substantial, compliance with the rule is
therefore required.

State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94

(Utah App. 1988).

The record as a whole test applies only in

pre-Gibbons cases.

See Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah

1985).
The basis for the Gibbons duty imposed upon trial courts is
found in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), where the United
States Supreme Court stated:
5

[What is at stake for an accused facing punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of which
courts are capable in canvassing the matter
with the accused to make sure he has a full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of
its consequence.
395 U.S. at 243-244.
In the instant matter, the trial judge relied heavily upon
an affidavit which the Appellant signed and acknowledged that he
had read (9/12/88 T. 4). Before accepting the Appellant's guilty
plea, the trial court did review the possible penalty (T.6), as
well as the elements and a factual basis for the guilty plea
(T.6-7).

However, the court never engaged in any conversation

with the Appellant whereby the court informed the Appellant that
by entering his guilty plea he would be waiving his rights
against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, to appeal, or to
confront the witnesses against him in open court.

These rights

were contained in the affidavit executed by the Appellant.
However, the recitation of the rights in the affidavit does not
satisfy the mandate of Gibbons and Vasilacopulos.
In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court imposed the burden of
establishing compliance with Rule 11(e) squarely on the trial
judge.

Affidavits do not take the place of on the record compli-

ance with Rule 11(e):
The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote
efficiency, but an affidavit should be only the
starting point, not an end point, in the plead6

ing process
The trial judge should
then review the statements in the affidavit
with the defendant, question the defendant
concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill
the other requirements imposed by section 7735-11 on the record before accepting the guilty
plea. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 1313-1314
In State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah App. 1989),
this Court repeated the requirement that the trial judge may not
rely upon an affidavit as a substitute for on the record compliance with Rule 11(e):
But, if such an affidavit or form is signed by
the accused and used as part of the guilty plea
to evidence his or her understanding of the
charged offense and waiver of certain rights,
that statement cannot serve as a mere substitute for the full and complete examination on
the record by the trial court as required by
the rule. (Emphasis added).
At the guilty plea hearing, the court did inquire, "Are you
entering that plea voluntarily?"
affirmative (T.8).

The Appellant responded in the

However, mere general questions which ask

whether a plea is "voluntary" are insufficient under Rule 11(e).
State v. Valencia, supra, at 1335.

Indeed, as to a Rule 11(e)(3)

deficiency, this Court in Valencia observed:
Specific inquiry should be made as to whether
defendant understands that by his plea he
waives his rights against self-incrimination,
to a jury trial, to appeal and to confront
witnesses
Instead, the court relied
only upon the form statement, which of itself
was deficient, mandating that we reverse the
7

conviction and the refusal to set aside the
plea.
Id. at 1335.
The Appellant has not moved to set aside his guilty plea at
the trial court.

The Rule 11(e)(3) error was only identified

after the Notice of Appeal and original Docketing Statement were
filed.

Just as in Gibbons, if the motion were unsuccessful, an

appeal would then be taken, resulting in two appeals in the same
case.

Additionally, in certain cases, this Court may consider

the failure to comply with Rule 11 and Gibbons as error sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be first raised on appeal to
this Court.

State v. Valencia, supra, at 1332-1334. According-

ly, this Court should reach the merits of Appellant's argument.
Appellant has established non-compliance with Rule 11(e)(3),
thereby necessitating reversal of the conviction.
POINT

II

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court established the standard for determining the
existence of ineffective assistance of counsel.

In order to

prevail on such a claim, a defendant must show, first, that his
or her counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's perform8

ance prejudiced the defendant.

Accord:

State v. Carter, 776

P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989).
Deficient Representation
In the instant matter, the Appellant was represented by a
variety of appointed counsel as well as at least one private
counsel prior to the date set for trial.

On the date of the

guilty plea, the matter was actually scheduled for trial and the
Appellant was representing himself.

At the request of Salt Lake

County Attorney, David Yocom, a former law partner, James Barber,
appeared in court on the spur of the moment.
to Court in casual attire.

Mr. Barber arrived

He explained his informal dress to

the court as follows:
May I apologize, your Honor, for appearing
without the appropriate accoutrements. But I
did so at Mr. Yocomfs request and hope the
court will condone that.
(9/12/88 T.2).
Mr. Barber is an extremely able and well respected defense
counsel.

He is certainly to be commended for his willingness to

drop everything and hurry over to court to assist a pro se defendant.

However, in doing so, Mr. Barber undertook the responsi-

bility of representing an accused (9/12/88 T.3). He had no
familiarity with the facts, legal issues, or possible defenses
that were available to the Appellant.

Indeed, his only role was

to stand beside the Appellant during the entry of the plea.

9

Under similar circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that the right to counsel was "not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the record by an attorney who manifests
no real concern about the interests of the accused."
Turner, 449 P.2d 241 (Utah 1969).

Alires v.

In Alires, in response to the

Defendant's request for counsel at the arraignment in the district court, the judge appointed an attorney who simply happened
to be in the courtroom at the time.

After a brief conference

with the defendant, a guilty plea was entered.

On appeal, in

granting the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the court
agreed with the petitioner that the representation that he received was merely a perfunctory appearance for the record, and
that he in effect had no counsel at all.

Id. at 242.

From an objective standard, competent defense counsel would
not presume to assess a criminal defendant's case in a matter of
minutes before shepherding an accused through a guilty plea.

In

order to reach an intelligent judgment about the likelihood of
prevailing on suppression issues or at trial, it would be necessary to take time to review the police reports in a given case.
Moreover, in order to assess the Fourth Amendment violation,
counsel needed to review a transcript of the testimony from the
suppression hearing.

No transcript had yet been ordered to that

was clearly not done in the instant matter.
10

Prejudice
In order to prove prejudice, a "defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome."

Strickland, supra, at

964.
In the instant matter, the Appellant had a valid suppression
issue to raise on appeal. However, by entering the guilty plea
the Appellant waived his right to challenge the propriety of the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.

Because this

Court had not yet decided State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App.
1988), the Appellant could only preserve his suppression issue by
going to trial. Absent the guilty plea and the waiver of the
pre-plea denial of the motion to suppress, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a different result because there was neither articulable suspicion nor probable cause to support the stop of the
Appellant's vehicle.
The test for determining whether detainment is valid is
whether specific and articulable facts exist which give rise to
reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity.
(Utah 1984).

State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408

In announcing his ruling, the trial judge applied a
11

probable cause standard to determine the lawfulness of the stop
of the Appellant's vehicle.

The Appellant recognizes that the

trial judge applied the wrong standard when evaluating the evidence in the instant matter.

A brief investigatory stop is

permissible when officers have reasonable suspicion, based upon
objective facts, that an individual was involved in criminal
activity.

State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985).

In the

instant matter, the Appellant submits that even if the trial
court had applied the correct standard, there was an absence of
articulable suspicion, based upon objective facts, which would
have lead a reasonable and prudent police officer to conclude
that either of the individuals in the Appellant's motor vehicle
had been involved in the commission of the forgery perpetrated by
Ms. Harris at the Harmons grocery store.
At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor, the Appellant
pro se, and the trial court all endeavored to zero in on precisely what facts formed the basis of the security officer's belief
that the individuals in the Appellant's vehicle might in some
fashion be connected to the commission of the forgery inside the
Harmons grocery store.

The Appellant, at a loss to understand

the security officer's logic in connecting the occupants of the
vehicle with the crime committed inside the grocery store, asked
the security officer the following question:
12

Q: Then you're saying because Ms. Vigil [the
arrested person] said there was a female out in
a gold car and that was the only gold car out
there, her mere statement of that lead you to
believe that those were suspects in the crime
that she had committed; is that your statement?
A: It gave me probable cause to stop the vehicle to find out i£ it was connected with the
crime that just occurred.
(8/16/88 T. 15-16).
Although the facts available to the security officer at the
time of the stop suggested that the arrested individual had come
with the two individuals in the automobile, the officer was
unable to articulate any facts which connected the individuals in
the automobile with the commission of the forgery.

The Appellant

also asked the security officer the following question:
Q: May
I return to the other question and say
thatfs the only reason you went out to stop
that car, was because you wanted to see the
people that Barbara Harris [the arrested person] was merely in that car?
A: I wanted to find out who the additional
suspects were. She stated there were other
individuals with her.
(8/16/88 T. 16).
Following the cross-examination of the security officer by
the Appellant, the prosecutor gave the security officer yet
another chance to articulate some facts to connect the individuals in the automobile with the commission of the forgery:

13

Q: Mr. Roberts, did you have any indication
from this individual who was later identified
to you as Barbara Harris, any indication that
the persons out in the gold car had anything to
do with the check?
A:

Yes we did.

Q:

What was that?

A: Ms. Vigil [later identified as Barbara
Harris, the arrested individual] stated that
she had come to the store with other parties;
that there was a female party in the vehicle,
and that there was a female and male party in
the vehicle and they were with her.
(8/16/88 T. 21-22).
Finally, even the trial judge asked the security officer
whether he relied upon any additional facts besides the statement
of the arrested individual that she had come with some other
individuals in a car out in the parking lot:
Court: Anything that was said that would lead
you to believe these individuals were participants of the crimes?
A: Before contact was made with the vehicle, I
had contacted the Salt Lake City Police Department, Detective Division, as well as our Detective Division. And the information that was
given to me was that there was several parties
involved in a check—I think cashing these
checks, that there were several different parties involved. And if it was possible to find
a vehicle, stop it and find out who else was in
the vehicle as they were accessories to this
check writing situation.
(8/16/88 T. 26-27).

14

Notwithstanding this testimony from the security officer, he
still did not articulate any facts from which to conclude that
the cashing of the check at Harmons on January 20, 1987 was
connected in any way with the cashing of other checks on some
earlier occasion.

Moreover, the security officer testified that

he thought he had been informed that there were several different
parties involved.

There was no elaboration by the security

officer as to what the basis was to believe that there was more
than one individual involved in the writing of checks.
The Appellant submits that the facts that were available to
the security officer at the time the Appellant's vehicle was
stopped did not amount to an articulable suspicion to believe
that the individuals in the motor vehicle were involved with
either the forgery at the Harmons, or any other forgery scheme.
The decisional law in Utah supports this view.

In State v.

Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), a police officer was patrolling a neighborhood which had experienced a lot of burglaries.
At 3:00 a.m. the officer saw a slowly moving vehicle with Arizona
plates.

The officer did not observe any traffic offenses. There

had been no report of any recent burglaries in the area. The
court held that the stop of the Arizona vehicle was unlawful.
The court explained that there were no objective facts on which
to base a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
15

The same is true in the instant matter.

The Appellant

submits that a two-tiered analysis of the facts available to the
security guard is useful•

The first tier of analysis can be

restricted to the information provided to the security officer by
the arrested individual.

That information can fairly accurately

be summed up as follows: A woman committed a forgery and when
asked whether she had come with anyone else indicated that she
had come with two individuals in a gold automobile in the grocery
store parking lot.

The Appellant agrees that these facts do

constitute an articulable and reasonable basis to identify the
Appellant's automobile as being the same automobile described by
the arrested woman.

However, the mere fact that the arrested

woman had come to the parking lot with two other individuals does
not amount to an articulable suspicion that the individuals in
the automobile were connected in any way with the criminal activity which had occurred when the arrested woman perpetrated the
forgery inside the Harmons store.

The woman's statement does not

provide an articulable basis to believe that the occupants of the
vehicle solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in the forgery.

Indeed, nothing in the woman's

statement even suggests that the occupants even knew that the
arrested woman intended to commit a forgery.

The law is well

settled in Utah that mere presence at the scene of a crime with16

out any additional participation is insufficient to constitute
accomplice liability.
The second tier of analysis can include the security
officer's testimony concerning accomplice participation•

It is

interesting to note that the security officer never mentioned the
accomplice information in answer to either the Appellant's or the
prosecutor's questioning.

Instead, the accomplice information

was only added when the judge repeated the same inquiry about
what information the security officer had available to believe
that the individuals in the car were participants in the forgery.
Even then, the security officer did not explain what the basis
was to believe that the forgery committed at the Harmons was
connected with any other forgeries, or what the basis was to
believe that there was more than one individual involved in the
other forgeries. Absent such a nexus, the Appellant submits that
even with the accomplice information all of the facts available
to the security officer did not constitute an articulable suspicion that the individuals in the vehicle were connected in any
way with the forgery.
In announcing its decision to deny the Motion to Suppress,
the trial court explained it was ruling (1) that the stop was
supported by probable cause; and (2) that the "evidence obtained
pursuant to that arrest" was admissable (8/16/88 T. 36). As
17

already stated, the Appellant concedes that the trial court
applied the wrong standard,

U.C.A. § 77-7-15 permits police

officers to make a brief investigatory stop of an individual if
the officers have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective
facts, that the individuals are involved in criminal activity.
However, in the instant matter, the stop of the Appellant's
vehicle was not supported by an articulable suspicion.

Moreover,

because the trial court ruled that the challenged evidence was
admissable as an incident of a lawful arrest, the Appellant was
entitled to the suppression of the evidence as fruits of the
poisonous tree.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
CONCLUSION

The failure of the trial court to fulfill the requirements
of Rule 11(e)(3) on the record at the time the Appellant pleaded
guilty necessitates setting his plea aside.

Additionally, be-

cause the Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel,
his conviction should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February, 1990.

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.,
Attorney for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing, by first class postage prepaid, this
, 1990, to:
Sandra L.
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

Sjogren
Attorney General
Capitol Building
City, Utah 84114
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APPENDIX

1

(a) Upon arraignment, except in case of an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court,
and shall not be required to plead until he has had a reasonable time to confer
with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall
enter a plea of not guilty.
Rule 11

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. Defendants unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise the defendant, or his
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury tnal
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest and shall
not accept such a plea until the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine in open
court the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives
all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence
that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and
plea agreement and if so, what agreement has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be approved by the court. If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by the
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea in the expectation
that other charges will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such tentative agreement and the
reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether he will
approve the proposed disposition. Thereafter, if the judge decides that final
disposition should not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement, he
shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm
or withdraw his plea.
(77-35-11, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 49, § 6.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment, in Subdivision (b), added "not guilty by
reason of insanity or guilty and mentally ill" to
the first sentence and added the second sentence
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